

Supplementary ARPI® Submission to 2026 Royal Commission on Anti-Semitism & Social Cohesion

The Australian Risk Policy Institute (ARPI®) welcomes the invitation to make a supplementary Submission to the Royal Commission focusing on item four, namely: “Metrics for assessing the prevalence of antisemitism in institutions and society, including through incident reporting and survey data.”

The Australian Risk Policy Institute (ARPI®) is an independent, not-for-profit organisation. Our purpose is to promote new thinking, new approaches and new frameworks concerning risk for leadership, decision-making and policy formulation and implementation. New approaches to risk are urgently needed as we live in the “Age of digital transformation, subject to rapid deterioration, and not in the same place.” Please see www.arpi.org.au for more information including current case studies.

The Royal Commission is being held at a pivotal time in the history of Australia, proudly recognized globally as a model of multi-culturalism, founded on the arrival by land of people referred to as First Nations and subsequently built with a rich tapestry of envisioning people as a nation of opportunity, peace, safety and protection. Of recent years that situation has changed dramatically, manifesting in extreme terrorism and related violent crime. Recovery is possible to avoid the current environment becoming a Wicked Problem in the technical risk sense. The situation is however well beyond Vulnerability, defined as potentiality or possibility of a strategic risk and is clearly now a Sovereign Risk with unfolding extreme consequences.

The solution lies in policy reform recognising unintended consequences from existing policy. The ‘Contemporary Case for Policy and Legislative Reform’ appears as an Addendum to this paper.

The impact of the Royal Commission will have a lasting place in the history and future of Australia.

Implementation analysis of policy and legislation has become, it is submitted, a national indeed whole-of-nation oversight. ARPI® offers the next generation of Strategic Risk Policy® Risk 4.0 as both a contemporary approach to implementation analysis of policy and legislation, to avoid unexpected consequences, and secondly, promoting leadership paradigm change to operate effectively in today’s world, in order to deliver ‘informed and pre-emptive decision-making’. This includes transition from organization-centric limitations to adopt a truly network-centric or eco system-centric inclusivity – as only seeing the totality or ‘wholeness’ of any situation enables effective leadership.

ARPI®’s most recent demonstration of the value-added metric of leadership in Strategic Risk Policy® occurred at the *Summit on Strategic Risk Policy® and Advanced Maritime Technology* held on 21 April 2026 at Parliament House with UK-based SubSea Craft, attended by national & international leaders.

ARPI® offers to assist Government in developing “Metrics for assessing the prevalence of antisemitism in institutions and society, including through incident reporting and survey data” and recommends the following introductory steps to achieve the desired outcome of the Royal Commission and through it, Australia:

1. Identifying what is of strategic value to measure – this must cover both the cause(s) of the current situation (including hopefully its progressive diminution) and its effects;
2. ARPI®’s global experience suggests that extreme incidents, based on driving motives, occur on a multiplier or domino basis – a ratio of one cause to ten effects is a valid assessment point;

3. Counting per se of incidents and events will not disclose an assessment and evaluation of the values, context and perspective of the whole dynamics – rather, a mixed-mode Qualitative<=>Quantitative approach is required, starting with concepts through to outcomes;
4. That is, not merely a prescriptive set of numerical statistics but rather a proscriptive frame measuring outcomes required by Australia;
5. ARPI®’s research and development have included mixed-mode methodology from performance indicators through to recently published work on Intelligence Equilibrium® - achieving a balance between Quantitative approaches including AI Artificial Intelligence limitations and areas outside the scope of AI, namely, “*Organized Human-Centric Intelligence*” titled Intelligence Augmentation IA. Thus AI↔IA constituting wholeness for decision-making and measurement.
6. Examples could include a return to safety in Australian streets and events, avoidance from supporting terrorism, revelations from network-based intelligence applying Strategic Risk Policy® principles underpinned by network-trust metric and cyber-security that is free from foreign infiltration or interference. All require and illustrate mixed-mode methodology;
7. While building resilience against extremism, a clear aim of “Redundant Resilience” must be Australia’s goal. Australia recognized as the ‘lucky country’ and advantageously surrounded by seas, enables strategic policy prevention of suffering foreign negativity; and
8. ARPI® submits that regard must also be had to the influence and outcomes of three key risk pillars of society to support recovery of sovereign safety, security and prosperity, namely:
 - a. Mass misinformation - the influence of extreme multi-media channels;
 - b. Intergenerational disinformation – children in the street supporting political violence;
 - c. Relationship between legislative frameworks and societal impact through courts.

Contact: inquiry@arpi.org.au

See ARPI® App

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ADDENDUM

‘The Contemporary Case for Policy and Legislative Reform’

Australia’s contemporary foreign-interference framework rests on a coherent and intellectually defensible foundation. It draws a clear distinction between legitimate foreign influence and illegitimate foreign interference; it focuses on covert, deceptive, or coercive conduct by foreign states; and it is built around the protection of Australia’s sovereignty, democratic processes, and political rights. These principles remain sound. They reflect our liberal democratic commitment to transparency, accountability, and the rule of law.

Yet the policy settings built on these foundations are no longer fit for purpose. They were designed for a world in which foreign interference was episodic, targeted, and primarily directed at democratic institutions. Today, Australia faces adversaries capable of waging continuous, industrial-scale information warfare against our people. Those operations target the cognition, emotions, and social cohesion of the Australian public, rather than government and Parliament. The existing policy settings were never designed for such large-scale foreign manipulation of our social environment.

The core problem is that Australia's foreign-interference architecture is conduct-specific, while modern information warfare aims at manipulating at much larger environmental and population scales. Existing law asks whether a foreign state is covertly attempting to influence political rights or the democratic process.

But cognitive warfare does not always look like a discrete act of influence. It is a persistent shaping of the information environment: saturating social media with polarising narratives, amplifying distrust in politics and institutions, manipulating identity-based grievances, and eroding the shared reality on which democratic decision-making depends. These operations may not be covert in the traditional sense, nor directed at a specific political event. They are ambient, continuous, and designed to weaken the cognitive resilience of the population over longer periods of time.

The current framework also assumes that intent can be meaningfully identified. But large-scale information operations often blend state-directed activity, state-encouraged activity, and decentralised participation by sympathetic actors (social media influencers). Attribution becomes probabilistic ("who benefits?") rather than definitive ("who do we prosecute?"). The law's requirement for demonstrable intent and direction by a foreign principal weakens prevention efforts.

Moreover, the system is built around interference directed at Australia, yet cognitive warfare often targets Australians as part of global campaigns, especially information campaigns from and about the Middle East. These campaigns may not be designed specifically to influence Australian political decisions, but they nonetheless shape the psychological environment in which Australian politicians operate. A foreign state does not need to target Australia directly to affect Australian politics; it only needs to influence the beliefs and emotions of Australian voters who, in turn, shape the incentives of Parliamentarians.

The result is a mismatch between the strategic scale threat and the tactically-oriented legal framework. The intellectual foundations remain valid, but the operationalisation is outdated. Australia needs a foreign-interference architecture that treats both the information environment as critical national infrastructure and recognises population-level cognitive security as a strategic priority. We must build resilience not only against discrete acts of interference but against the continuous manipulation of public perception.

Without such reform, Australia risks fighting a new form of nationwide warfare with tools designed for tactical law enforcement.